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Abstract
Cryptocurrencies offer an alternative to traditional methods of electronic value exchange, promis-
ing anonymous, cash-like electronic transfers, but in practice they fall short for several key reasons.
We consider the false choice between total surveillance, as represented by banking as currently im-
plemented by institutions, and impenetrable lawlessness, as represented by privacy-enhancing cryp-
tocurrencies as currently deployed. We identify a range of alternatives between those two extremes,
and we consider two potential compromise approaches that offer both the auditability required for
regulators and the anonymity required for users.
1 Introduction
The surveillance economy has arrived [1]. The popularity of online service platforms has enabled service
providers to collect, aggregate, and analyse data about the behaviour of individuals with a volume
and scope never before possible. Data brokers have created a marketplace for exchanging information
about individuals that can be used to link their various online actions, including but not limited to
financial transactions. Such information, including the reuse of credentials over successive transactions,
can be used to link the transactions to the transacting parties [2, 3]. Such a linkage can greatly simplify
successive transactions, reducing costs for the provider and improving customer experience. However,
the potential for monitoring profoundly influences the everyday behaviour of individuals as they conduct
their various activities [4]. The value of such control is reflected in an emerging marketplace for record
linkage via entity resolution, which seeks to determine the specific individual person associated with
any given activity and, correspondingly, the history of activities associated with any given individual
person [5, 6].
In the context of longstanding arguments that privacy is a public good [7, 8, 9, 10], it is worthwhile
to consider whether such practices may serve to exacerbate social inequity by restricting the ability
to transact privately to those with sufficient wealth and power [11, 12]. Financial transactions are
no exception, since they reveal information about not only the volume and recipients of individuals’
purchases and remittances but also their patterns, location histories, social networks, and so on. Modern
retail banking creates a kind of panopticon for consumer behaviour, ultimately promising to implement
a mechanism that binds all of the financial activities undertaken by an individual to a single, unitary
identity. Consumers have legitimate reasons to resist such surveillance, particularly in cases wherein
monitoring is carried out without their knowledge and judgments based upon such monitoring are used
to disincentivise or punish legitimate activities. The risk to consumers increases with the ever-increasing
share of financial transactions that are performed electronically. The increasing capability of third parties
to aggregate and analyse data about retail financial transactions fundamentally changes the relationship
between individuals and their financial institutions.
Cryptocurrencies seem like a natural alternative for exchanging value that can avoid the watchful
eye of state actors, powerful corporations, hackers, and others who might be well-positioned to build a
dossier of one’s activities. However, a lack of appropriate regulation generally burdens cryptocurrency
users with practical limitations and risks. The risks include the lack of financial products and services,
the inability to earn interest, basic consumer protection, and the absence of legal infrastructure for
adjudicating disputes. China has also restricted the use of cryptocurrency exchanges as a means of
addressing capital outflows [13].
Additionally, most cryptocurrencies are not as privacy-enhancing as is commonly perceived, and as
state actors attempt to erect a cordon around criminal activity that relies upon cryptocurrencies, some
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Robust to cyberattacks
Usable without registration
Unlinkable transactions
Electronic transactions
Suitable for taxation
Can block some illicit uses
Can be denominated in
units of fiat currency
Table 1: Desiderata for an electronic payment method.
governments have actively sought to undermine the adoption of cryptocurrencies that are most respectful
of an individual’s privacy. For example, the Financial Services Agency in Japan pressured cryptocur-
rency exchanges to drop privacy-enhancing tokens such as Monero [14], one of the largest cryptocurrency
exchanges in South Korea subsequently delisted privacy-enhancing tokens [15], the US Department of
Homeland Security specifically called for methods to circumvent privacy protections in privacy-enhancing
cryptocurrencies [16], and the UK Financial Conduct Authority offered guidance indicating its intention
to “prevent [rather than simply prosecute] the use of cryptoassets for illicit activity” [17]. Further-
more, whether or not these government initiatives succeed in preventing untraceable cryptocurrencies
from achieving mainstream adoption, even the most private cryptocurrencies suffer from the arguably
intractable governance challenges associated with building a decentralised network that respects the
interests of its users.
Following the G20 summit held in Buenos Aires in 2018, leaders resolved to “regulate crypto-assets
for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism in line with FATF standards” [18].
Earlier, the UK Parliament had published a report citing lack of consumer protection and regulated
marketplaces for crypto-assets as major drawbacks associated with cryptocurrencies as a medium of
exchange, also noting the possibility that anonymous transactions might promote money laundering is a
significant perceived risk, despite that the UK National Crime Agency had assessed the risk as low [19].
So we have reached an impasse, with institutions demanding control and countenancing surveillance at
one extreme, and cyberlibertarians demanding privacy at the expense of regulation on the other.
Let us commence this article by introducing a set of “desiderata”: properties that a payment system
should have. They are listed in Table 1. In addition to usefulness, security, and privacy, we also
note the various arguments for money as a “valid payment for all debts” [20], as a means of funding
government activity through taxation [21]. We discuss how we can reframe our requirements such
that we might achieve a parsimonious set of regulatory objectives while also respecting privacy and
fulfilling the desiderata. We follow and extend the ongoing discussion of how to regulate cryptocurrency
payments [22, 23], with a view toward respecting human rights [24].
The paper is organised as follows. In the remainder of the first section, we discuss the regulatory con-
text surrounding modern retail financial transactions, and we introduce cryptocurrencies as a prospective
substitute for regulated payments. In the second section, we compare and contrast three methods of
conducting financial transactions online: modern, regulated retail banking; classic cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin; and privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies such as Monero. In the third section, we introduce
two candidate approaches that each offer individuals a verifiable means of transacting privately and also
provide suitable mechanisms by which institutions can enforce regulatory compliance. In the final section
we conclude with a discussion of the opportunities and tradeoffs.
1.1 Institutional Posture
Banks and other financial intermediaries in many jurisdictions around the world are subject to anti-
money laundering (AML) or “know your customer” (KYC) regulations that require them to collect data
on individual accountholders and others who make use of their services [25, 26]. The penalties for non-
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compliance are potentially severe. In recent years, banks have dedicated significant resources to building
and maintaining compliance infrastructure, evidenced by the thousands of employees that they have
hired to monitor “high-risk” transactions, as well as “tens of thousands of costly customer calls every
month to refresh KYC documents” [27].
An international organisation named the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established by
the G7 in 1989 as a trans-national effort to monitor financial activities, with the stated purpose of
investigating and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing [28]. FATF provides one of the
mechanisms by which AML/KYC regulations in different jurisdictions are promulgated and coordinated.
FATF also publishes a blacklist of nations who fail to enforce rules that facilitate the identification
and investigation of individual accountholders, with the purpose of coordinating sanctions that force
blacklisted nations to conform [29].
The financial regulations imposed by economically powerful jurisdictions such as the United States
and the European Union share common features. In the US, AML regulations provide for customer iden-
tification and monitoring, as well as the reporting of suspicious activities [30]. In the EU, Directive (EU)
2018/843 (“5AMLD”) requires that every financial transaction must be associated with an account, and
that every account must be associated with a strongly identified responsible individual [31]. The direc-
tive also significantly reduces the maximum allowed value for prepaid cards and stipulates that remote
transactions above EUR 50 must be accompanied by customer identification [31]. Note that 5AMLD
specifically includes cryptocurrencies as subject to its prescribed regulations on financial transfers.
Although the systematic collection of identifying information for individual accountholders might
facilitate important investigations, it also provides a mechanism by which authorities can browse com-
prehensive or near-comprehensive financial information about individuals without their knowledge. Au-
thorities with those capabilities, and the businesses positioned to aggregate and analyse data collected for
compliance purposes, may also be able to conduct statistical evaluations of individuals based upon the
information available to their financial institutions. Once aggregated and linked to unitary identities, the
transaction data collected by financial institutions offer a detailed look into the habits, patterns, travels,
associations, and financial health of individuals.
The risks associated with such surveillance of electronic transactions were recognised fifty years ago
by Paul Armer of the RAND Corporation, who identified the risk in a 1968 US Senate deposition [32]
and later argued that “if you wanted to build an unobtrusive system for surveillance, you couldn’t
do much better than an [electronic funds transfer system]” [33]. Indeed, payment networks routinely
share information about financial transactions with credit bureaus such as Experian [34], who are in the
business of judging individuals by their behaviours and whose judgments form the basis of decisions made
by lenders, insurers, and other clients of analytics companies [35]. Additionally, documents released by
Edward Snowden have revealed that the US National Security Agency has a division called “Follow the
Money” (FTM) that systematically collects and analyses data from payment networks [36].
1.2 Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies have enjoyed popularity in recent years, and people have flocked to cryptocurrencies for
a variety of reasons. The idea of accountless digital cash is hardly new, dating at least as far back as the
1982 paper by David Chaum on blind signatures [37], the technology that he later used to start DigiCash
Inc, which folded in 1999 [38]. Other attempts to develop accountless electronic payment systems such
as E-Gold [39] and Liberty Reserve [40] were designed with privacy in mind, and ultimately ran afoul of
authorities when criminals used those systems for nefarious purposes.
By the time Bitcoin emerged in early 2009 [41], the financial crisis had prompted aggressive responses
from central banks around the world, and surely it was no coincidence that the message of circumventing
inflationary monetary policy enjoyed appeal among would-be hoarders. However, given the history of
privacy as a primary motivation for the adoption of digital cash, we surmise that many of the cryptocur-
rency adopters (other than speculators) are primarily seeking privacy, whether to circumvent capital
controls or just to avoid the “pastoral gaze” of state or corporate surveillance [42]. Some important de-
velopments in recent years corroborate this view, most notably the attempts to develop a “stablecoin”:
a cryptocurrency that avoids the volatility of cryptocurrency prices by establishing a market peg, for
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example to a fiat currency [43]. The most notorious example of a stablecoin is Tether, a cryptocurrency
that was established for the purpose of maintaining a one-to-one peg with the US Dollar [44, 45]. For this
reason, stablecoins can be denominated in units of fiat currency. However, stablecoins have important
limitations, including well-justified concerns about unilateral exchange rate pegs in general [46].
As a replacement for the “legitimate” currencies underwritten by the full faith and credit of sovereign
governments, cryptocurrencies are far from perfect. There are structural reasons for this, including:
1. Absence of financial services. There is a notable absence of reliable organisations that offer routine
financial services such as lending, and more importantly, there is a lack of regulatory support for
crytpocurrencies. Further, in contrast to transactions conducted via global messaging systems such
as SWIFT [47], there is generally no way to correct or unwind erroneous transactions performed
with permissionless cryptocurrencies, a critical operational limitation. For cryptocurrencies to be
a true substitute for government-issued currencies, they must support a range of marketplaces and
financial products.
2. Absence of regulated marketplaces. History tells us that unregulated marketplaces for financial
products can be harmful to ordinary citizens and businesses alike; consider for example the mis-
behaviour of brokers and market participants that led to the creation of the US Securities and
Exchange Commission [48]. Cryptocurrency markets lack such controls and mechanisms to ensure
accountability, and unchecked market manipulation is commonplace [49, 50].
3. Absence of legal context. There is no generally applicable mechanism for adjudicating disputes
arising from transactions that are executed in cryptocurrency. When automatically executable
contracts such as those that underpinned the “Decentralised Autonomous Organisation” that roiled
the Ethereum community in 2016 [51] are exploited, there is little legal recourse for hapless victims.
Although “certain operational clauses in legal contracts” may be automated to beneficial effect [52],
it would seem that a maximalist conception of the principle of “code is law” may not be workable
without a suitable legal framework.
Furthermore, cryptocurrencies often fail to deliver on their key promises. For example, they are
often not as private as is commonly believed. Analysis of Bitcoin transactions can deanonymise them,
and researchers have shown that it is eminently possible to identify meaningful patterns among the
transactions [53, 54]. The problem persists not only as a result of prevalent web trackers and the reuse of
pseudonyms linked to Bitcoin wallets [55] but also because inbound transactions to a Bitcoin address can
fundamentally be linked to outbound transactions from that address [56]. Indeed, it has even been argued
that the explicit traceability of transactions on the Bitcoin ledger, combined with a straightforward
approach to tagging suspect transactions [57], make it even less private than traditional mechanisms of
payment. Even cryptocurrencies such as Monero, which are designed for privacy, have been shown to have
important weaknesses [58, 59]. Another, perhaps equally important deficiency of cryptocurrencies is that
they are not as decentralised as is commonly believed. Although decentralisation is often touted as the
raison d’eˆtre of cryptocurrencies [60], in practice the governance, “mining,” and infrastructure services
associated with cryptocurrencies have remained stubbornly centralised for a variety of reasons [61]. The
problem of decentralisation is intimately related to the more elemental governance problem how to ensure
that the system serves the interest of its users. Without institutional support, there is little to ensure
that this remains the case.
The governance problem is of particular significance to stablecoins. Importantly, if a stablecoin is
not maintained and controlled by a central bank, then its users would need to be concerned about who
is ultimately providing assurance that it will retain its value.
2 Electronic Payments Today
As electronic funds transfer systems have proliferated in recent decades, so has the expectation that
people will make use of those systems. If this trend were to continue, we would anticipate that the fixed
costs associated with infrastructure to support cash transactions would become harder to justify, and
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Figure 1: Schematic Representation of Modern Retail Banking Transaction Flows. The buildings with
columns represent financial institutions with which the transacting parties hold accounts. Money is
exchanged in state-issued currency, as represented by the Pound Sterling symbols. Authorities and other
powerful actors can monitor both the institutions and the flows, as represented by the magnifying glasses.
variable costs such as widespread deployment of ATM machines would be reduced. Individuals and small
businesses have various options to conduct transactions electronically. “Electronic” financial transactions
include nearly all economic transactions that are not conducted using cash, notwithstanding the use
of precious metals, money orders, and barter. For our purposes, all payments involving institutional
accounts, including card payments (via payment networks), wire transfers, ACH, and even physical
cheques, are conducted electronically, as are payments conducted using cryptocurrency. Next, we shall
consider the characteristics of transactions in three examples of electronic payments: those involving
institutional accounts, those involving “basic” cryptocurrencies, and those involving “privacy-enabling”
cryptocurrencies.
2.1 Modern Retail Banking
Modern retail banking involves electronic transactions between accounts, each of which represents a bilat-
eral relationship between a financial institution (e.g., a bank) and another entity, perhaps an individual.
Institutions are generally regulated by governments. Individuals and businesses may agree to exchange
value (for example, in return for goods and services), but in reality the transaction takes place between
institutions, which mutually agree to modify the state of the accounts such that the account of the
“receiver” is incremented and the account of the “sender” is decremented correspondingly. Record of the
transactions and their results are generally visible to the institutions, accountholders, authorities, and
auditors. Figure 1 offers an illustration of the data flows corresponding to two transactions. Institutions
are direct participants in the transactions. Both the accounts and the transactions may be monitored,
i.e. “external” observers such as authorities (and in some cases others, such as unprivileged employees
of the institutions and hackers) are able to examine the records of the transactions, their results, and
the transactions themselves. Since the set of regulated institutions is small, it is efficient for an observer
to collect, aggregate, and analyse the data associated with substantially all of the transactions that take
place within the system.
By contrast, data on transactions involving cash are relatively difficult to observe in this fashion, and
are therefore more private. However, although cash remains a popular instrument for retail transactions,
its use is decreasing as consumers become more comfortable with electronic means of payment [62]. Some
economists such as Kenneth Rogoff hail this transformation as a welcome development, citing reductions
in tax evasion and crime as primary benefits as anonymous payments are curtailed [63]. Others are more
circumspect. Citing Sweden’s drive to become cashless, Jonas Hedman recognised the loss of privacy
as the primary disadvantage of a cashless society, although he also acknowledged that the transition
to cashlessness is inevitable [64]. Assuming that the insistence on unitary identifiers for all electronic
financial transactions as proposed by regulations such as 5AMLD [31] is satisfied, and combined with
large-scale aggregation and analysis of the sort already in practice [36], cashlessness means the creation
of a browseable “permanent record” for every individual containing his or her entire transaction history.
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Figure 2: Schematic Representation of Bitcoin Transaction Flows. Transacting parties can store value
on their own devices, represented as piggy banks. The flows can be monitored by anyone.
2.2 “Basic” Cryptocurrency, e.g. Bitcoin
Cryptocurrencies offer an alternative payment mechanism that avoids some aspects of the surveillance
infrastructure that characterises institutionally-mediated retail bank transactions. Modern cryptocur-
rencies generally take the form of bearer instruments, in the sense that their units are each represented
by a public key on a public ledger and controlled by the knowledge of the matching private key. Users
are not required to establish accounts or furnish identification information of any sort to receive, possess,
or spend cryptocurrency. This is not to say that accounts do not exist; most users of popular cryp-
tocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum establish accounts with centralised wallet providers such as
blockchain.info or myetherwallet [61]. Providers of accounts could be compromised or subverted by state
actors or other powerful groups with an interest in surveillance. Some account platforms cooperate with
national regulators [65], and some national regulators have declared that they will limit the scope of the
rules that would apply to such platforms [66]. Many if not most cryptocurrency transactions are done
by speculators, not those who intend to use cryptocurrency for its fundamental properties [67], so even
if most traders in practice might be indifferent to strong identity requirements crafted by regulators to
satisfy AML goals, such rules undermine a key design objective of cryptocurrencies themselves.
In principle, however, users of cryptocurrencies are not required to register with platforms, and they
may possess cryptocurrency tokens on their own devices. Figure 2 shows how this works in practice.
Assuming that cryptocurrency users take precautions not to reveal their identities whilst transacting,
for example by using anonymity systems such as Tor [68], they might expect to avoid identity-based
blacklisting when they receive tokens. However, depending upon the system design, adversaries may still
be able to monitor the flows. Because successive Bitcoin transactions are linkable to each other, those
able to monitor the network can determine successive transactions associated with specific tokens and
ultimately deanonymise Bitcoin users [53, 54, 56].
The fact that individual tokens can be traced means that cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin may not
be entirely fungible, in the sense of being “easy to exchange or trade for something else of the same type
and value” [69], as an individual might be less willing to accept certain specific cryptocurrency tokens
because doing so might implicitly link that individual to previous owners of the tokens. Traceability has
created demand for newly-minted or “clean” tokens that are harder to link to the previous owners or
(ultimately) the previous transactions of the current owner [70], and the proposed blacklists of cryptocur-
rency addresses associated with suspicious operators could further exacerbate this distinction [71]. To
avoid this problem, a cryptocurrency implementation would need to offer assurance that a transaction
by an asset holder would generally not, directly or indirectly, result in that asset holder being linked
to other transactions that had taken place previously. Additionally, cryptocurrencies that make use of
immutable ledgers and do not protect against traceability may for that reason be non-compliant with
data protection regulations such as GDPR that specify a “right to be forgotten” [72].
2.3 “Privacy-Enabling” Cryptocurrency, e.g. Monero
Some cryptocurrencies, most notably Zcash and Monero, are explicitly designed to address traceability
concerns [73]. Monero in particular takes an approach that incorporates several security mechanisms,
including:
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Figure 3: Schematic Representation of Monero Transaction Flows. In an “idealised” version of Monero
or other privacy-enabling cryptocurrency, observers would not be able to infer information about trans-
acting parties or the relationships between transactions by monitoring the ledger or the transactions
themselves, as indicated by the magnifying glasses with the negation symbol. The piggy banks indicate
that users are storing the tokens privately rather than relying upon accounts.
1. Ring Signatures, which allow signed messages to be attributable to “a set of possible signers without
revealing which member actually produced the signature” [74].
2. Stealth Addresses, which refer to methods for key management in which public keys are derived
separately from private keys for the purpose of obscuring the public keys [75], and
3. Confidential Transactions, which use Pedersen commitment schemes [76] to restrict disclosing the
amounts transacted to anyone other than the transacting parties [77].
Figure 3 illustrates how, in a successfully implemented privacy-enabling cryptocurrency, metadata
associated with transactions would be hidden such that the data flows or the ledger would not reveal
relationships among transactions or any information about the transacting parties. That said, the Monero
design and implementation still do not completely realise this goal; its process for mixing transactions
suffers from inconsistent selection probability among all elements of the anonymity set [58]. Monero
spokesperson Riccardo Spagni countered that “privacy isn’t a thing you achieve, it’s a constant cat-and-
mouse battle” [78], echoing longstanding arguments by others that privacy is inevitably an endeavour of
vigilance and responsiveness [79].
Some authorities such as the Japanese Financial Security Agency (FSA) [80, 81] and the United
States Secret Service [82] have responded to so-called “privacy coins” by banning the use of privacy-
enhancing cryptocurrencies whilst accepting other cryptocurrencies as legitimate by comparison. For
a cryptocurrency exchange or other provider of cryptocurrency-based financial services to be compliant
under such rules, it would need to restrict its activities to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum
which do not have the privacy characteristics that have been sought by cryptocurrency advocates for
decades.
There have also been some attempts, notably Mimblewimble [83], to retrofit basic cryptocurrencies
with some of the characteristics of privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies, although it remains to be seen
whether such approaches will turn out to be more effective than cryptocurrencies designed with better
intrinsic privacy features in the first instance.
3 Proposed Hybrid Approaches
We consider the following challenge facing policymakers, regulators, and technologists alike: how can we
achieve realise the benefits of government regulation without creating a central database that irreversibly
connects all persons with all of their transactions? There are two parts to this question. The first
part is primarily about technology: can we build a system that securely processes financial transactions
conducted electronically without revealing data about the transacting parties? The answer is yes, as
described in our discussion of privacy-enabling cryptocurrency, with an important qualification that
privacy is really an iterative process that can only really be developed through active commitment and
ongoing vigilance. The second part is primarily about government policy:
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Robust to cyberattacks  # # # #
Usable without registration  #    
Unlinkable* transactions H# # # #  
Electronic transactions #     
Suitable for taxation H#  # H# #
Can block some illicit uses #  # # #
Can be denominated in   #  #
units of fiat currency
*Potentially
Table 2: Comparison of various existing electronic payment methods. [*Potentially]
• What exactly are the key government objectives for regulating transactions?
• Which objectives are essential, and which can be deprioritised?
• Do any of the objectives conflict with the human right to privacy?
Table 2 shows how the existing payment methods achieve the desiderata listed in Section 1. (None of
the popular cryptocurrencies are known to offer totally unlinkable transactions, continual improvements
notwithstanding.) Can we achieve a compromise that does better than the prevailing methods for
electronic payments?
In this section we introduce two approaches to frame the discussion of how to resolve the tension. The
first approach, institutionally supported privacy-enabling cryptocurrency, provides regulated institutions
with tools and procedures for interacting with privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies, creating a structure
for legal interpretations of their use. We assume that the distributed ledgers underlying such cryp-
tocurrencies are not controlled by regulated financial institutions. The second approach, institutionally
mediated private value exchange, establishes a method by which regulated institutions can conduct fi-
nancial transactions on a distributed ledger that shares essential characteristics with privacy-enabling
cryptocurrencies. In this case, we assume that the distributed ledgers used for this purpose are controlled
by regulated financial institutions. The main difference between the two approaches is that the first ap-
proach allows businesses to transact with cryptocurrencies that are managed and governed outside the
mainstream financial system, and the second approach provides a way for regulated financial institutions
to offer a mechanism for their clients to exchange money that resembles cryptocurrency in that clients
can withdraw money electronically and subsequently use it without reference to an account, as they
would with cash.
There is a third possibility, which we might describe as “institutionally supported privacy-enabling
stablecoins,” in which the privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies in question are actually stablecoins. This
possibility is theoretically worth pursuing if stablecoins achieve popularity commensurate with cryp-
tocurrencies, although the experience of Tether suggests it might not be easy. It is worth considering
that the proposal for institutionally mediated private value exchange is similar to a stablecoin in that the
tokens represent units of fiat currency. However, because the regulated financial institutions are assumed
to be part of the banking system they would not need to bear the risk associated with maintaining a
market peg.
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Figure 4: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Supported Privacy-Enabling Cryptocurrency:
Nodes. Institutions would join global networks of servers operating as nodes in existing cryptocurrency
networks; not all participants in these networks are regulated institutions.
Figure 5: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Supported Privacy-Enabling Cryptocurrency:
Transaction Flows (1). (We use the Monero symbol to represent any privacy-enabling cryptocurrency
without loss of generality.) Corporations and registered businesses with accounts held by regulated
financial institutions (leftmost icon) that would be subject to monitoring and may only remit cryptocur-
rency payments to other accounts held by regulated financial institutions. Individuals and non-business
partnerships (centre icon) may transfer cryptocurrency from accounts to unmonitored, private storage
(rightmost icon).
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Figure 6: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Supported Privacy-Enabling Cryptocurrency:
Transaction Flows (2). An individual (shown at left) with a private store of cryptocurrency could re-
mit payments without revealing her identity to a business with accounts held by a regulated institution
(shown at right).
3.1 Institutionally Supported Privacy-Enabling Cryptocurrency
Our first approach starts with existing, privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies such as Zcash or Monero and
assumes that regulators have chosen to embrace the new methods for exchanging value and accept,
if not support outright, at least some of the various communities that have formed around particular
cryptocurrencies to provide governance and software development. Acceptance of cryptocurrencies by
governments and other institutions is certainly plausible; for instance, the Bank of England concluded
that cryptocurrencies “currently do not pose a material risk to UK financial stability” [84]. It assumes
that government priorities include collecting taxes and monitoring transactions undertaken by businesses
and regulated institutions.
Figure 4 illustrates how institutions would join existing cryptocurrency systems as full participants.
The motivation for broker-dealers and other institutions to participate is well-established; financial ser-
vices related to cryptocurrencies are in demand by hedge funds and other clients [85, 86]. Of course, this
implies that broker-dealers would likely undertake activities related to unregulated markets and mar-
ketplaces (i.e., the cryptocurrencies themselves), and presumably the governance of the cryptocurrencies
would not be under institutional control. That said, the distributed ledger underlying the cryptocur-
rencies would ensure that there would be an audit trail of all transactions, even if the details of those
transactions might be inscrutable to authorities, auditors, or others without the active participation of
the transacting parties.
To facilitate monitoring, auditing, and taxation, we assume that regulators would stipulate that all
cryptocurrency transactions undertaken by certain legal entities other than individual persons, such as
registered corporations, licensed businesses, charities, trusts, and some partnerships, must take place via
regulated institutional intermediaries such as banks, custodians, or broker-dealers. In general, such legal
entities are already subject to various forms of government oversight, for example tax reporting require-
ments, so to introduce additional requirements and enforceability for cryptocurrency transactions is not
unfathomable. The institutions would carry out AML/KYC compliance procedures as they currently do,
and regulators would require that all cryptocurrency disbursements from such registered corporations or
organisations, including dividends, interest, proceeds from disposal of cryptocurrency-denominated as-
sets, and payments, including without limitation payments to suppliers, service providers, employees, and
contractors, would take the form of remittances to other institutional accounts that hold cryptocurrency.
Individuals and non-business partnerships would not be subject to the same requirements and would
be permitted to transact and hold cryptocurrency privately, as they do in many countries today. Figure 5
shows how this would work in practice. Businesses would maintain accounts with institutions and could
direct the institutions to remit payments to other institutionally held accounts, including those whose
beneficial owners are individuals, and individuals could in turn direct their institutional accounts to
remit payments to their private cryptocurrency storage, which might or might not be hosted by a wallet
provider. Individuals could then remit payments from their own private storage to regulated businesses,
such as merchants, private organisations, or service providers, without necessarily revealing their iden-
tities or a link to previous transactions such as those from which they received the cryptocurrency in
the first place; Figure 6 offers an illustration. Given that the legal entities covered in the last paragraph
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Figure 7: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Supported Privacy-Enabling Cryptocurrency:
Transaction Flows (3). Individuals with private stores of privacy-enabling cryptocurrency may transact
directly without revealing their identities.
are typically subject to financial reporting requirements, for example to quantify reimbursements or to
reconcile changes in assets with income, we assert that it would be no easier for a business to deputise an
individual to conduct cryptocurrency transactions on its behalf than it would for a business to deputise
an individual to conduct any other financially meaningful aspect of its business.
Dividing the different ways of holding the cryptocurrency into two categories based upon whether or
not it is held via accounts associated with regulated institutions may be considered analogous to dividing
Zcash into “T” (Transparent) and “Z” (Shielded) addresses [87].
Because all cryptocurrency accounts held by corporations and registered businesses would be subject
to monitoring by regulated institutions, the infrastructure would ensure that the taxable income of such
corporations and businesses would be known. Because all payments from corporations and registered
businesses must be remitted to other institutional accounts, the infrastructure would ensure that the in-
come of their shareholders, suppliers, service providers, and employees would be known and attributable
to the correct legal entities. Authorities would realise other benefits as well. The distributed ledger main-
tained by the cryptocurrency node operators would be observable by regulators and other authorities and
cross-referenced against any cash flow statements of businesses engaged in cryptocurrency transactions.
Private transactions suspected of criminal activity could be verified by investigators with the cooperation
of one of the counterparties, even if the investigation might not necessarily reveal identifying details of
the other counterparty.
One type of transaction under this system that might be of particular concern to authorities is
illustrated by Figure 7, in which an individual with a private cryptocurrency store remits cryptocurrency
to another individual with a private cryptocurrency store, not involving a regulated institution. The fact
that such transactions could take place without the involvement of institutions means that authorities
would be unable to completely enforce restrictions on who is able to transact, in accordance with the
FATF recommendations [28]. We could argue that value will find its way to criminal organisations with
or without the sanctions advised by FATF [88], or that those willing to break the law have many options
to anonymously acquire “legitimate” accounts [89], or that prospective money launderers with sufficient
assets will find other ways to transact outside the the system. Whether or not such arguments are
sound, cryptocurrencies might become a dominant form of exchanging value precisely because people
value privacy, in which case regulators will need to support cryptocurrency transactions simply because
those are the transactions that are taking place. After all, people certainly exchanged value before central
banks started issuing currency.
Another, equally important, characteristic of this approach is that without institutional mediation at
their core, cryptocurrencies are subject to the vicissitudes of mining pools, hackers, and powerful global-
scale actors who might compromise or hijack them, as well as speculators and market manipulators who
might simply deplete their value. However, an alternative interpretation of that property is that different
cryptocurrencies would compete with each other, not only on the basis of market penetration but also
on the basis of privacy. It is difficult to imagine a currency in a monopoly position, state-sponsored or
otherwise, having this characteristic.
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Figure 8: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Mediated Private Value Exchange: Nodes. The
distributed ledger is operated by a federation of regulated institutions.
3.2 Institutionally Mediated Private Value Exchange
Our second approach starts with the assumption that the “public” cryptocurrencies are not suitable for
all kinds of institutional support, perhaps for the reasons cited in Section 3.1. Instead, it proposes to
establish a distributed ledger for conducting financial transactions, and that each node of the distributed
ledger would be owned and operated by a regulated institution, as shown in Figure 8. This could be
achieved with a “permissioned” distributed ledger system such as Hyperledger [90], using an energy-
efficient Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus algorithm such as PBFT [91]. Users and governments would
benefit from the fact that transacting parties would not need to use cryptocurrency of dubious value but
in fact could transact using digital versions of state-issued currency, i.e. central bank digital currency
(CBDC), which is currently under consideration by central banks around the world and may offer a
variety of economic and operational benefits [92].
At this point it might be tempting to suggest that since the entire network consists of regulated
or otherwise approved financial institutions, then governments should require the establishment of a
“master key” or other exceptional access mechanism, so that they might be able to break the anonymity
of users. We argue that this temptation should be resisted. Over the years, policymakers have called for
broadly applied exceptional access mechanisms in a variety of contexts, and after considerable debate,
such calls have been found to be premature and subsequently withdrawn [93, 94, 95]. Indeed, legislators
in the United States [96] and France [97] have gathered opposition to exceptional access mechanisms,
citing their intrinsic security weaknesses and potential for abuse.
Indeed, for the approach we present to be a private value exchange, the regulated institutions must
commit to facilitating private transactions. At one level, the institutions must adopt the specific tech-
nologies such as ring signatures, stealth addresses, and confidential transactions used by privacy-enabling
cryptocurrencies such as Monero. At another level, the institutions must commit to an ongoing effort
to audit, challenge, and improve the technology and operational procedures, because privacy-enhancing
technologies require vigilance [79]. It follows that the institutions and the authorities of the jurisdictions
in which they operate must commit to ensuring that the technology and operational procedures are effec-
tive in safeguarding the privacy of transacting parties against politically, financially, and technologically
powerful groups who might have contrary interests.
It is assumed that authorities would take the same measures described in Section 3.1 to ensure that
corporations and registered businesses use known, monitorable accounts for all of their transactions.
Enforcement of such a policy would be qualitatively easier in this case since the entire network is owned
and operated by regulated institutions, and regulators could expect the same benefits associated with
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Figure 9: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Mediated Private Value Exchange: Private Trans-
actions. As in Figure 5, an individual receives funds into her institutional account (second icon from
left) and transfers them to her private store (second icon from right). Unlike in Figure 5, the funds may
be state-issued currency, as indicated by the Pound Sterling symbols, rather than cryptocurrency. When
she wants to make a payment, she must remit it from her private store to an account held by a regulated
institution (rightmost icon).
£ £
Figure 10: Schematic Representation of Institutionally Mediated Private Value Exchange: Mediated
Transactions Between Consumers. Individuals (outer icons) wishing to transact with each other via their
private stores rather than accounts with regulated institutions must transact via a regulated intermediary
(centre icon).
monitoring taxable income and reconciling line items in cash flow statements against actual, auditable
transfers on the distributed ledger.
State actors would realise another important benefit from this approach as well. Because all transac-
tions must necessarily involve a regulated institution, transactions of the sort described in Figure 7, in
which private actors exchange value directly via their own private stores, would not be possible. Figure 9
illustrates how a user would make payments privately. A user would initially receive funds into her ac-
count with a registered institution, which she would in turn remit to her private store. When she wants
to make a payment to a merchant or service provider, she can remit the funds to the account that that
organisation holds with a registered institution. The privacy features of the distributed ledger, such as
ring signatures, stealth addresses, transaction confidentiality, and any other necessary features that may
be developed from time to time, would ensure that when the individual makes the payment, she does
not reveal either her identity or any information about her prior transactions, including the transactions
from which she originally received the funds.
By ensuring that no single enterprise receives too large a share of any individual’s transactions in
the system, the use of a distributed ledger achieves an essential requirement of the design. Individuals
would be expected to use their private stores to transact with many different counterparties, via their
own regulated intermediaries, so no single intermediary would have a global, “panopticon-like” view of
all of the individual’s transactions.
Since individuals cannot transact directly via their private stores, to exchange value they must trans-
act via a regulated intermediary as shown in Figure 10. Individuals conducting transactions might not
need to have accounts to exchange value with each other; we surmise that the regulated intermediary
would perform the service for a fee. We also suggest that the intermediary would not be required to
carry out strong identification of the sort required by the FATF recommendations [28] but might require
a less-stringent form of identification, such as an attribute-backed credential indicating that either the
13
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Robust to cyberattacks  # # # # # #
Usable without registration  #     #
Unlinkable* transactions H# # # #    
Electronic transactions #       
Suitable for taxation H#  # H# #   
Can block some illicit uses #  # # # #  
Can be denominated in   #  # #  
units of fiat currency
*Potentially
Table 3: Comparison of various electronic payment methods, including the new proposed methods.
sender or the receiver are eligible to transact [98]. Regulated intermediaries could also provide token
mixing services for groups of individuals who satisfy AML criteria, without explicitly requiring knowledge
of their unitary identities.
If successfully operationalised, the approach described in this section would offer governments the
same benefits to taxation and auditing as the approach described in Section 3.1, and governments would
additionally gain the ability to impose blacklists or economic sanctions on targeted recipients. Individuals
would receive the same privacy benefits described in Section 3.1 for transactions involving merchants and
service providers, and identification requirements of intermediaries for other transactions could be made
parsimonious. However, there are two main drawbacks for individuals seeking privacy, the first being
that individuals would need to interact with a registered intermediary before they are able to make
or receive payments. The other, more serious concern is the question of the mechanism by which the
privacy-enabling properties of the system is assured. Inasmuch as cryptocurrencies represent a check
on state power [42], we have reason to believe that the privacy characteristics of cryptocurrencies will
continue to improve, despite their demonstrable shortcomings [58, 59].
If the regulated institutions that design, deploy, and maintain the infrastructure for executing trans-
actions are asked to carry the flag for the privacy of their clients, then there could be a misalignment of
interests. Clients would need to know the actual privacy limitations of the infrastructure, so adversarial
audits would need to be carried out from time to time in the interest of the public. Then, institutions
would need incentives and resources to continuously improve the infrastructure and fix any deficiencies
on an ongoing basis. A process for admitting new participants would be necessary to ensure that the
network remains distributed, and it would need to satisfy an openness criterion to ensure that privacy-
threatening procedures do not develop outside the view of the public eye. There would also need to
be a diversity of implementations, such that sporadic vulnerabilities do not threaten the privacy of a
significant share of the users of the system.
Arguably, such incentives exist among cryptocurrencies, since they must compete for business. It re-
mains to be seen whether effective auditing and competition could assure the privacy-enabling properties
of a value exchange operated entirely by institutions.
4 Conclusions
Framing the ongoing conversation about the future of payments as a set of tradeoffs, we introduced
two possible candidate architectures for a privacy-enabling electronic value exchange: institutionally
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supported privacy-enabling cryptocurrency and institutionally mediated private value exchange. Both ar-
chitectures require both the design, implementation, deployment, and maintenance of new technology as
well as the development of regulatory policy in which such technology will operate. Table 3 summarises
the tradeoffs and contextualises our two prospective approaches. Cash has many desirable properties,
such as universality (i.e., its use does not require a relationship with a registered institution) and privacy
in practice (serial numbers on banknotes can be traced but generally are not). However, it cannot be
sent across computer networks and is sometimes used for illicit transactions, including tax evasion. In
contrast, modern retail banking requires accounts and facilitates large-scale surveillance. The most pop-
ular cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin do not actually avoid surveillance and are in some ways potentially
easier to trace than ordinary retail transactions. Privacy-enabling cryptocurrencies promise to address
both deficiencies, although research has shown that the goals motivating their development have not yet
been fully achieved.
The various approaches to electronic payments each have their own advantages and limitations, and
by elaborating the tradeoffs, we hope to facilitate a more fulsome conversation among the stakeholders
and offer a useful framework for discussing future solutions. We believe that both approaches have
their place and prospective adherents, and the adoption of one would not exclude the adoption of the
other. Businesses that offer services to cryptocurrency users and traders would find value in the first
approach, and businesses seeking to facilitate private, cash-like electronic transactions within a regulated
system would find value in the second approach. Correspondingly, some regulators might be troubled by
supporting trade in assets whose value and uses are beyond their reach, as would be the case in the first
approach, and some privacy-minded individuals might be troubled by the possibility that the regulated
financial institutions that operate the system described in the second approach might secretly collude to
compromise the anonymity of their clients.
We suggest that institutionally supported privacy-enabling cryptocurrency would be strictly better
than privacy-enabling cryptocurrency without institutional support, mainly because regulators would
benefit from the ability to monitor corporations and registered businesses that use cryptocurrencies. We
also suggest that institutionally mediated private value exchange would be strictly better than modern
retail banking as currently practiced, mainly because users would avoid payment networks and enjoy an
improved expectation of privacy in their ordinary activities. However, neither approach achieves all of
the objectives of both parties. For example, the ability to transact without interacting with a regulated
institution may be incompatible with the ability for a government to block illicit use. Similarly, monetary
policy might not be possible if cryptocurrency governance were exogenous to the state, although the
possibility of this happening at scale seems remote. As the hard choices for the future of payments come to
light, we believe that acknowledgment and discussion of these tradeoffs, as well as a commitment to both
serious privacy and serious regulation, are prerequisites for advancing the interests of all stakeholders.
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